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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1996) wherein the Court is granted jurisdiction in appeals from a court
of record in criminal cases.
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Whether the trial court properly admitted a photograph into evidence, not previously
disclosed in discovery, after attorney for Appellant opened the door to its admission by
questioning the victim as to whether any such photograph existed. Issues of law are
reviewed under a correctness standard, without deference to the trial court.
Meadowbrook, L.L.C. v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115 (Utah 1998).
STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes, rules and constitutional provisions relevant to the
determination of this matter are set forth in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1996)
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16
STATEMENT OF CASE
On October 25, 1998, Defendant/Appellant Kent Leon Mecham (hereinafter
"Appellant",) was charged with Battery in violation of Salt Lake City Ordinance §11-08020. Record at 1 (hereinafter "R."). A jury trial was held on June 9, 1999, before the
Honorable Robin W. Reese in the Third District Court, Salt Lake Division. R. 31. The
jury returned a verdict of guilty. R. 66. Appellant was sentenced on August 2, 1999, to
2

180 days jail with 120 days suspended, and placed on one year probation with Adult
Probation and parole. R. 78. Appellant filed a notice of appeal on August 24, 1999. R.
81.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On October 25, 1998, the Defendant/Appellant, Kent Leon Mecham (hereinafter
"Appellant"), was charged with Battery, a class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Section
11.08.020 ofthe Salt Lake City Code. R. 1. OnJune9, 1999, a jury trial was conducted,
the Honorable Robin W. Reese presiding. R. 31. Appellant was convicted. R. 66. Prior
to the trial, Attorney for Appellant filed a Request for Discovery on February 4, 1999. R.
8. The prosecution responded to the request for discovery on February 8, 1999. R. 9.
The prosecution's reply denied Appellant's general request for discovery and indicated
that the prosecution was providing only the information contained in its file and that other
evidence might exist. R. 9.
During the course ofthe trial, the victim, Jenny Serenko, (hereinafter "victim"),
testified that that the defendant had struck her in the face. R. 95:26-28. She further
testified that she received some injuries as a result ofthe battery committed by the
Appellant. R 95:29-30. Photographs ofthe victim taken by the Salt Lake City Police
Department Crime Lab, and provided to Appellant as discovery, showing injuries to her
face on the date ofthe incident, were also introduced into evidence. R 95:30. Officer
Shawn Josphenson ofthe Salt Lake City Police Department testified that he observed
injuries to her face on the date ofthe incident. R. 95:54-56. The victim testified that in
3

the weeks following the battery, the bruising to her face became substantially worse than
what was observed and photographed on the day of the incident. R. 31. Counsel for the
Appellant asked the victim "Do you have any photos of the other damage that you've
claimed?" R. 95:45. The victim responded " Oh yes, I do." R. 95:45. On redirect, the
prosecutor then sought the admission of a photograph in the victim's possession, arguing
counsel for defendant had opened the door to it's admission. R. 95:45-49. The trial judge
admitted the photograph into evidence. R. 95:49. The photograph was taken several
weeks after the incident by a neighbor of the victim. R. 95:48. The prosecutor did not
know of the existence of the photograph in the victim's possession until the night before
trial and had not seen the photograph prior to trial. R. 95:65. The photograph had not
been provided to Appellant pursuant to his request for discovery. R. 95:65.
Appellant's statement of the facts are not supported by the record, in that he states
that the victim testified she had provided the prosecution with the photograph.
Appellant's brief, page 13. Nowhere does the record reflect that the prosecution was in
possession of the photograph. The record reflects only that the prosecution was informed
of the existence of the photograph on the night before the trial. R. 95:65. Counsel for
Appellant asked the victim if she had "ever offered those to the Court." R. 95:45. The
victim responded, "Yes I have." R. 95:45. Counsel for Appellant did not clarify what
this question or response meant. R. 95:45. The photograph was in the possession of the
victim, not in the possession of the prosecutor. R. 95:45. The prosecutor did not intend
to admit the photograph into evidence and did not do so during the prosecution's case in
4

chief. R. 95:45. The trial court found that the photograph was inculpatory, not
exculpatory. R. 95:68. The trial court found that the prosecutor had not intentionally
"[hid] the ball." R. 95:87. The photograph was admitted only after the attorney for
Appellant opened the door by questioning the victim regarding the existence of any
photographs that would substantiate her claims of injury. R. 95:45-46, 84-90.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court correctly admitted the photograph after the attorney for defendant
questioned the victim regarding the existence of any photographs substantiating her
claims of injury. The prosecution did not have a duty to disclose the evidence pursuant to
Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedures. While State v. Knight and subsequent
case law have imposed additional discovery requirements on the prosecution, the
prosecution fully complied with those requirements. First, the prosecution's response to
the request for discovery specifically denied the general request. Second, the response
indicated that the materials being provided were only the materials in the prosecution's
file. Third, the response indicated that other evidence might exist. Finally, the response
provided the name, phone number and address of the victim, providing Appellant the
opportunity to question the victim prior to trial and discover, as the prosecution had, the
existence of a photograph in her possession.
The Supreme Court of Utah has imposed upon Appellant a duty to exhaust
remedies available under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure for alleged
5

discovery violations. The Supreme Court and this Court have held that failure to do so
waives any right to claim error. By failing to request a continuance in order consider the
possible repercussions of and prepare for the surprise photograph, Appellant failed to
exhaust remedies available under Rule 16(g). He therefore waived his right to claim
error.
The weight of the evidence is such that there is not a substantial likelihood of a
different outcome absent the admission of the photograph in question. In addition to the
photograph at issue here, the prosecution presented additional evidence of the same
injuries through the testimony of the victim, the testimony of a Salt Lake City police
officer and the admission of photographs taken on the date of violation by a crime lab
photographer. This cumulative evidence as to the victim's injuries makes it unlikely that,
absent the admission of the single photograph, the verdict would have been different.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ADMITTED THE PHOTOGRAPH.
A.

The Prosecution was not required to provide a copy of the photograph
pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require the production of inculpatory
evidence not in the possession of the prosecution. Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure requires:
(a)

Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
6

defense upon request the following material or information of which
he has knowledge:
1)

Relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;

2)

The criminal record of the defendant;

3)

Physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;

4)

Evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant; or mitigate the degree of
the offense for reduced punishment; and

5)

Any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for
the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 16
The photograph at issue was in the possession of the victim. It was not in the
possession of the prosecutor. The prosecutor did not know of its existence until the night
before trial and had not seen the photograph prior to trial. It is not a written or recorded
statement of the defendant. It is not part of the criminal record of defendant. It did not
tend to negate the guilt or mitigate the guilt of the defendant or mitigate the degree of
offense. The court did not order it provided. Pursuant to Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure the prosecutor had no obligation to provide copies of the photograph
to defendant pursuant to his discovery request.
In State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987), upon which defendant relies, the
Utah Supreme Court does expand the duties of the prosecutor in providing discovery
upon request of the Defendant. In Knight, the Court held that once the prosecutor
7

voluntarily provides discovery pursuant to Rule 16 (a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, without requiring defendant to obtain a court order, then the prosecutor has a
duty to "respond to a request in a manner that will not be misleading." Id. at 916. The
Court states that the prosecution has a duty to identify items in the discovery request that
have not been provided. Id. at 916. In Knight, the Utah Supreme Court further states that
"For the misleading-the-defense rationale to apply, the discovery requesl must be
sufficiently specific to permit the prosecution to understand what is sought and to justify
that parallel assumption on the part of the defense that material not produced does not
exist." Id. at 917.
In the present case the prosecutor complied with the discovery requirements
imposed pursuant to Knight. First, the prosecutor did not voluntarily provide discovery
pursuant to Rule 16 (a)(5,) but sent a specific response indicating that Appellent's general
request for discovery was denied. The response further indicated that the materials being
provided were only the materials that were in the prosecutor's file. Moreover, the reply
instructed Appellant that other evidence might exist outside the prosecutor's file.
"Plaintiffs Reply to Defendant's Request for Discovery and Certificate of Service" is
included in the Record at page 9. Thus, the prosecution complied with the requirements
of Knight, and responded to Appellant's general request for discovery in a manner that
was not misleading. The response specifically indicated that the only material being
provided pursuant to the discovery request was material in the file of the prosecutor and
that other evidence might exist. Therefore, because Appellant could not have been misled
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by the prosecution's discovery response into believing no other evidence existed,
pursuant to Knight, the misleading-the-defense rationale cannot apply.
Moreover, in Knight, a discovery violation occurred when the prosecution did not
know the location of key witnesses and indicated such in their reply to the defendant's
request for discovery. After subsequently locating the witnesses, the prosecution in
Knight then failed to provide the defendant with their current addresses, depriving the
defense of an opportunity to prepare for their testimony. In the present case, the name,
address and phone number of the victim were included in the materials that were
provided. The attorney for Appellant had the same opportunity to question the victim
prior to trial as the prosecution, and to discover the existence of the photograph in the
same manner the prosecution did.
The prosecution's response to appellant's request for discovery was specific in
denying appellant's general request for discovery and informing appellant that the
information provided was only the information in the possession of the prosecutor and
that other evidence might exist. Therefore, the prosecution fully complied with discovery
requirements.
B. Appellant's due process rights were not violated by the admission of the
photograph.
Admission of inculpatory evidence is not a violation of the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution. In State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518, 522 (Utah Ct. App.
1998), this Court addressed the obligation of the prosecutor in providing discovery to a
9

defendant. The Court held that the State had a duty provide "all exculpatory evidence."
This Court went on to hold that because the evidence at issue in Rugebregt was
inculpatory, the "prosecutor's discovery duty was limited to disclosures under Rule 16."
Id. at 522.
Appellant's reliance on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.E&2d 215, 83 S.Ct.
1194 (1963) is without merit. Brady held that "suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused . . . " [emphasis added] violates due process.
Therefore Brady, which deals with exculpatory evidence, is not on point. The trial court
in the present case found that the photograph at issue was inculpatory.
Appellant's further reliance on case law regarding prosecutorial misconduct is also
without merit. The court found on the record that the prosecution in the present case had
not intentionally withheld evidence. While Appellant has argued that the prosecution
should not be rewarded for non-disclosure, no duty to disclose existed in the present case.
Neither should the prosecution be held accountable for the conduct of counsel for
Appellant in committing the cardinal sin of trial practice, to wit: never ask a question to
which you do not know the answer .
Because the evidence at issue was inculpatory rather than exculpatory, the due
process clause of the United States Constitution was not impacted and Appellant suffered
no violation of rights as claimed.

10

II.

BY FAILING TO REQUEST APPROPRIATE RELIEF UNDER RULE 16(g)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, APPELLANT
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO CLAIM ERROR.
Appellant waived his right to claim error by failing to exhaust relief available for

alleged discovery violations under Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Rule 16(g) of the Utah Rules of Criminal procedure provides relief for discovery
violations, including granting a continuance. The Utah Supreme Court has held that
failing to exhaust remedies available under Rule 16(g) essentially waives a defendant's
right to later claim error. State v. Larsen, 115 P.2d 415, 418 (Utah 1989). In State v.
Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court held that by failing to
move for a continuance "defendant waived relief under rule 16(g)... by not making
timely efforts to mitigate or eliminate the prejudice ...." This court has similarly held
that dismissal of a case was inappropriate where the defendant failed to exhaust Rule
16(g) remedies, such as requesting a continuance. State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944,
948 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Rugebregt, 965 P.2d 518 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998), where evidence was introduced through a expert witness, the substance of
which was contrary to the information provided pursuant to a request for discovery. In
Rugebregt, this court held that because the defendant had failed to request a continuance
or "devise any means of dealing with [the] . .. unexpected testimony," the defendant
waived his right to challenge to the surprise evidence. Id. at 522. Similarly in this case,

11

Appellant failed to request a continuance to prepare for the unexpected photograph.
Therefore, Appellant waived his right to challenge the admission of the photograph.
m.

THERE IS NOT A SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD THAT THE VERDICT
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF THE PHOTOGRAPH HAD NOT
BEEN ADMITTED.
The cumulative evidence in this case was sufficient such that the admission of the

single photograph is unlikely to have affected the outcome of the verdict. See First Gen,
Servs. v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "'[E]ven if we were to
conclude that the evidence here was improperly admitted, that would not decide the issue.
We still would have to determine whether the error was harmful.'" Id., quoting State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). In the present case, the cumulative evidence
against the Appellant was such that the jury would have certainly rendered the same
decision even if the photographs had been excluded.
We will not overturn the trial court's decision regarding
admissibility of evidence unless it was an abuse of discretion. ...
Moreover, even if the court erred in admitting the challenged
evidence, "we will only reverse if this error was harmful, ci.e., if
absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of an outcome more
favorable to the defendant.'"
State v. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688, 699 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) quoting State v. White, 880
P.2d 18, 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (in turn quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1221
(Utah 1993)).
The jury had the opportunity to assess the credibility of the victim, the investigating
police officer, and Appellant. The victim testified as to her injuries. The photographs
12

taken by the Salt Lake City Police Department Crime Lab on the day the injuries occurred
were consistent with the victim's testimony and were offered into evidence. The
Officer's testimony about the injuries he observed was consistent with the victim's
testimony and the crime lab photographs. The photograph taken two weeks later by the
victim, showed the same injuries as those visible in the crime lab photographs and those
testified to by both the victim and the officer. They were simply in a different stage of
development.
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in State v. Thomas, 91A P.2d 269
(Utah 1999). In Thomas, the prosecution did not reveal the existence of an inculpatory
letter to the defendant. Id. at 271. The prosecution did not admit the letter into evidence
during its case in chief. However, on cross-examination of the defendant, the prosecution
used the letter to impeach his credibility. Id. at 271. The Utah Supreme Court held that
the admission of the letter into evidence was harmless where " . . . the September letter
was not a critical factor in proving the State's case; apparently the State was not even
planning on using the letter before hearing Thomas's testimony." Id. at 276. Thomas is
directly on point with the facts of this case, where the photograph was likewise not a
critical factor in proving the City's case and the prosecutor was not even planning on
using the photo before hearing the defense cross-examine the victim regarding the
existence of any photographs that substantiated her claimed injuries. And, unlike in
Thomas, although the prosecutor in the present case found out the about the existence of
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the photograph a few hours before trial, the prosecutor did not have the photograph in her
possession. The photograph was always in the possession of the victim.
Considering the weight of other evidence, including the officer's testimony
corroborating the victim's testimony, and the crime lab photographs, there is no
"reasonable likelihood of an outcome more favorable to the defendant" in the present
matter. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d at 699. The admission of the photograph was harmless.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff/Appellee respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of the trial
court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ft

day of May, 2000.

JEANNE M. ROBISON (USB #6975)
Assistam City Prosecutor
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
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^ /o *.« w. ww^j.*. w.w ~t^«saj.s jurisdiction
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all
writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments/ orders, and decrees;

or

(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory
appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state
agencies or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the
agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the
executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the
state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local
agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are
incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a
conviction of or the sentence for a first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs

rune 10. jLFiscovery.
(a) Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of which he has
knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendant;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the degree of the
offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good cause
shown should be made available to the defendant in order for the defendant to
adequately prepare his defense.
(b) The prosecutor shall make all disclosures as soon as practicable following the filing of charges and before the defendant is required to plead. The
prosecutor has a continuing duty to make disclosure.
(c) Except as otherwise provided or as privileged, the defense shall disclose
to the prosecutor such information as required by statute relating to alibi or
insanity and any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the prosecutor in order for the
prosecutor to adequately prepare his case.
(d) Unless otherwise provided, the defense attorney shall make all disclosures at least ten days before trial or as soon as practicable. He has a
continuing duty to make disclosure.
(e) When convenience reasonably requires, the prosecutor or defense may
make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material and information
may be inspected, tested or copied at specified reasonable times and places.
(f) Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that discovery
or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is
appropriate. Upon motion by a party, the court may permit the party to make
such showing, in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to be
inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief
following such an ex parte showing, the entire text of the party's statement
shall be sealed and preserved in the records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
(g) If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the
attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court
may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may
enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
(h) Subject to constitutional limitations, the accused may be required to:
(1) appear in a lineup;
(2) speak for identification;
(3) submit to fingerprinting or the making of other bodily impressions;
(4) pose for photographs not involving reenactment of the crime;
(5) try on articles of clothing or other items of disguise;

